Expelling the Barbarian and the Last Stand: Examining the Newly Established Meiji Government’s Reaction to Foreign Pressure and National Strife in 1868 by ROBINSON-YAMAGUCHI Eleanor & Eleanor ROBINSON-YAMAGUCHI
─  ─47
Expelling the Barbarian and the Last Stand
Expelling the Barbarian and the Last Stand:
Examining the Newly Established Meiji Government’s Reaction  
to Foreign Pressure and National Strife in 1868
Eleanor ROBINSON-YAMAGUCHI
1. Introduction
2. Internal Struggle, External Pressure and the Influence of Thought
 2.1 Peasant Uprisings and Political Instability
 2.2 The Foreign Threat
 2.3  Nineteenth Century Japanese Thought and the Prevalence of Mito School Ideals
3.  The Last Stand: Three Key Incidences of Jōi in 1868 and the Significance of Nawate
 3.1 The Kobe Incident
 3.2 The Sakai Incident
 3.3 The Nawate Incident and the End of the Jōi Movement?
4. Conclusion
 Acknowledgements
 Notes
 Bibliography
概　要
　本稿は日本の中での紛争や日本国外からの外圧という概念を考えながら攘
夷論を検討し、明治新政府はどのような対応をしたのかを検討する。従って
攘夷の運命を決めた三つの重大な事件が起こった明治時代の始まりを焦点と
する。攘夷はどのように発展していったのか、どのようにテロの一種として
使われたのか、そして結局どのように明治政府に鎮圧されたのかを理解する
ために1868年の背景を説明する必要がある。本稿は特に明治維新で活躍した
人物の坂本龍馬（1835‒1867）や中井弘（1838‒1894）などの志士たちの役割
を考察する。当時、日本国内の政治的な問題やその他の問題点、そして日本
国内で認知された外国からの脅迫を述べた後更に、志士の思想の起点となっ
た水戸学の影響を検討する。水戸学の思想を普及させたのは水戸藩の会沢正
志斎（1781‒1863）と藩主の徳川斉昭（1800‒1860）だった。
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　攘夷の発展と終結の興味深いところは、最初に「攘夷」を信奉した志士た
ちがその後、新政府の指導者たちだったことである。以前尊重していた構想
を排除するため、志士だった人物が新政府の指導者として日本国民のために
新たな規則を定めた。日本政府のこのような新政策の最も意義深い転機と言
えるのは1868年の始まりに起きた三つの重要な事件であり、その中に特に、
縄手事件である。政策の転機は当時イギリスの公使だったハリー・パークス
（1828‒1885）の要求に大いに影響されたと言える。
　本稿の目的はその三つの重要な事件に対する認識を高めることであり、特
に現代の日本史研究やその他の歴史的な書物で忘れさられている縄手事件の
重要性を強調することである。特に本稿ではその三つの事件にかかわった人
物に対しての認識を高めるつもりであり、その中、中井弘の行動を注目す
る。
キーワード：水戸学、神戸事件、堺事件、縄手事件、中井弘
Abstract
 This paper will examine the concept of jōi, or ‘expelling the barbarian’, 
by first considering the internal struggles within Japan, as well as foreign 
pressure from outside powers, and finally look at how these issues were dealt 
with by the new Meiji government. The focus period of the paper, therefore, 
will be the beginning of the Meiji period, particularly the year 1868, when 
three key incidences decided the fate of jōi. It is necessary to explain the 
background to the events of 1868 in order to establish how jōi developed, 
was used as a form of terrorism, and how it was eventually stamped out by 
the new Meiji government. The paper, in particular, will consider the roles of 
the shishi, or ‘men of purpose’, such as Sakamoto Ryoma (1835–1867), Nakai 
Hiromu (1835–1894) and other key figures who worked toward the restoration 
of Imperial power. After an examination of the political and other internal 
problems as well as observing the perceived foreign threat, the paper will 
consider the influence of Mito-gaku, or, the Mito School of thought, which 
formed the basis of ideas among those ‘men of purpose’. Key characters that 
helped to propagate these ideas include Aizawa Seishisai (1781–1863) and 
Lord Tokugawa Nariaki (1800–1860) of the Mito domain.
 The most intriguing element about the development and ultimate demise 
of jōi is the fact that many of those ‘men of purpose’ who had initially 
espoused the notion of ‘expelling the barbarians’ were the same men who later 
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took charge of the new government. As the new government leaders, they 
established new rules for the Japanese people to follow in order to eliminate the 
very concept they had once held in high esteem. The three key incidences, and 
particularly the Nawate Incident, of early 1868 can be described as perhaps the 
most significant turning point in this change of Japanese government policy. 
It may be said that such policy change was heavily affected by the demands of 
the then British Minister, Harry Parkes (1828–1885).
 The purpose of this paper is to realise greater recognition for those three 
important incidences and particularly the last incident at Nawate because it 
is often completely overlooked in historical scholarly, and other forms of, 
literature. In particular, this paper is an attempt to draw more attention to the 
participants of those incidences, most notably, Nakai Hiromu.
Keywords:  Mito Ideology, Kobe Incident, Sakai Incident, Nawate Incident, 
Nakai Hiromu
1. Introduction
 On the 15th day of the eleventh month of Keio 3 in the old Japanese lunar 
calendar (December 10th, 1867 in the Western calendar), two men were 
attacked in an upstairs room of a soy sauce shop called Ōmiya in central 
Kyoto. Sakamoto Ryōma, a low ranking samurai from the Tosa domain 
(today’s Kōchi Prefecture), was killed almost immediately; he was 33 years 
old. His friend and comrade, Nakaoka Shintarō (1838–1867), the son of a 
village headman, also from Tosa, lingered on for two more days; he was 
just 29 years old. Evidence of who the perpetrators of the assassination 
were is not clear, but the story of Sakamoto and Nakaoka’s deaths is well-
known to many of the Japanese population, young and old. They stood for 
something they believed was truly important, and they are now considered 
to be two of Japan’s greatest national heroes, particularly Sakamoto. These 
two men were shishi, or, as the term has been translated, ‘men of purpose’1. 
Their ‘purpose’, initially, was Sonnō Jōi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the 
Barbarian), a movement, which impacted the eventual collapse of the 
Tokugawa government and the restoration of Imperial rule in 1868.
 Shishi were usually low-ranking samurai and ‘rōnin’, or ‘samurai without 
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a master’. Many of them had abandoned their home domains in order to fight 
in the name of the Emperor. Several historians have suggested that these men 
had become disappointed with the Tokugawa government system. They felt 
frustrated by the way their own local domain rulers, as well as the central 
Tokugawa government rulers, had been dealing with both Japan’s internal 
strife and the pressures from other countries for Japan to open to trade. The 
historian Albert M. Craig, however, is disinclined to believe that this theory 
of the cause of the Restoration being disgruntled low-ranking samurai is the 
sole answer to the overthrow of the Tokugawa government. He argues,
During the fifties, in the United States as well as in Japan, the prevalent 
interpretation was that in the partially closed Tokugawa society, low-
ranking men of ability had overthrown the Tokugawa regime because 
they were frustrated by their exclusion from high office and resentful 
of the privileges of inept men of high rank. Such negative sentiments 
doubtless existed, and should be considered as a part of any explanation, 
but a simple theory based solely on such sentiments, I came to feel, 
explained too little.2
Craig’s point is a valid one. There was certainly negative sentiment among 
these men, but there was more to their sentiment than just envy of high 
rank and the privileged men who had it. These shishi were raised on, and 
influenced by, the prevalent thoughts which were rooted in Mito-gaku, or 
the Mito School/Ideology. These men rallied together under the cries of 
“Sonnō Jōi!” believing that the Emperor was the son of Heaven and thus the 
rightful ruler of Japan. They also believed that the foreign ‘barbarians’ had 
no right being in Japan, which to them was a ‘Divine Realm’3. They therefore 
demanded, and fought for, the expulsion of all foreigners from Japanese 
shores. There are several cases of assassinations attributed to these men, both 
of Tokugawa leaders who supported the opening of Japan to foreign trade, 
and foreign residents within Japan. For the Tokugawa government, these men 
were what in modern terms might be considered ‘terrorists’. However, it is 
also important to note that a number of these ‘terrorists’ later became heads 
of the new Meiji government that began in 1868. Upon visits to the ‘Western 
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world’, a proliferation of Western knowledge, and a realisation that the West 
could not be beaten without that knowledge, some of these ‘men of purpose’ 
had a change of heart.
 This paper will look at under what influences the shishi came together, and 
how their beliefs and ideals shaped the development and eventual decline of 
the Sonnō Jōi Movement. For example, the role of the earlier noted Sakamoto 
Ryōma and his friend and comrade, Nakaoka Shintarō is important to this 
history. In some ways these two men, though they worked together a great 
deal, they had quite different approaches and ideas about how to deal with 
the problems they faced. Nakaoka was fairly mild in his ideas to begin with, 
but he became more militant and aggressive in his approach later. In contrast, 
although Sakamoto originally had a great hatred of foreigners, he later 
developed more temperate ideas. The historian, Marius Jansen points out that 
in a letter to his father when he was nineteen years old, Sakamoto wrote,
 Since foreign ships have come to several places, I think there will be a 
war soon. If it comes to that you can be sure I will cut off a foreign head 
before coming home.4
 Despite these strong patriotic words, Sakamoto later developed a more 
accepting stance. As his thoughts developed, he gradually came to the 
conclusion that it would be more beneficial to learn from the West and carry 
out trade relations with Western countries. His association with men such as 
the Tokugawa government official Katsu Kaishū is believed to have been a 
key influence in Sakamoto’s change of heart. Katsu encouraged Sakamoto 
to round up many rōnin, or master-less samurai, these ‘men of purpose’, 
and help to train them in Western naval and navigation skills. Sakamoto’s 
connection to Gotō Shōjirō, a retainer of Lord Yamauchi Toyoshige (also 
known as Yamauchi Yōdō, 1827–1872) of Sakamoto’s own Tosa domain, as 
well as a samurai from the domain of Satsuma, Nakai Hiromu, was perhaps 
also influential to Sakamoto’s development of ideas in creating a new Japan; 
ideas that encouraged trade with, and learning from, other nations. Sakamoto 
is known for bringing together a group of men who called themselves the 
Kaientai. The Kaientai established the beginnings of a trading company 
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based in Nagasaki called Kameyama Shachū. With his connections to fellow 
Tosa man, Iwasaki Yatarō (1835–1885), who later went on to establish the 
Mitsubishi zaibatsu, Sakamoto and his Kaientai members purchased Western 
ships for Japan, patrolled the Japanese coastline, and trained men in the 
Western art of navigation.
 In a similar way to Sakamoto, Nakai Hiromu, a somewhat less well-known 
character in the history books, also originally had ideas of expelling the 
barbarians, but after visiting Britain in 1866–67, a move that is believed to 
have been encouraged by Sakamoto, he developed a more liberal approach 
to the foreign influx to Japan. Nakai is believed to have initially associated 
with the Seichū-gumi5, a group made up of men from Satsuma that had 
included such famous names as Saigo Takamori (1828–1877) and Ōkubo 
Toshimichi (1830–1878) who were loyal to the Emperor and wanted the 
complete expulsion of foreigners in Japan. Nakai’s early days were very 
strongly connected with men whose ideas were on the side of the extreme. 
For example, Nakai is understood to have been associated with Ōhashi 
Totsuan (1816–1862)6 who, during what is known as the Sakashitamon 
Incident of 1862, was involved in the attempted murder of Andō Nobumasa, 
a Rōjū, or Council Elder, of the Tokugawa government who was in favour 
of Kōbu Gattai, or a ‘Union of the Imperial Court and the Shogunate’. That 
incident had almost ended in a similar fate to the Sakuradamon Incident of 
1860 in which the then Rōjū, Ii Naosuke had been murdered for accepting 
Commodore Perry’ demands to open Japan for trade with the West. Also like 
Sakamoto, Nakai later befriended Gotō Shōjirō. The two became very closely 
connected, with Nakai even using the alias Gotō Kyūjirō at one point in his 
career. The pair also became key players in the Nawate Incident, which this 
paper will examine later in section 3.3.
 In order to understand how the ideas of such patriotic men were formed, 
it is important to consider the historical background of the times, both prior 
to and, in which they lived. For some 250 years, Japan had been a largely 
isolated island terrain, out of the physical reach of most Western influence. 
The government was largely centralised and kept the Japanese citizens in 
check with various penalties for venturing away from the islands. No one, 
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under pain of death, was allowed to enter or leave the archipelago. Only the 
Dutch and Chinese had been allowed to trade at the sole port of Dejima, a 
small fan-shaped island off the mainland of Nagasaki. All other nations had 
been banned by the Tokugawa government in the early 1600s, for fear that 
they would try to influence the Japanese people with Christianity, and then 
try to take over the country. There was a genuine fear that if the Christians 
gained power in Japan, the ruling Tokugawa Shogun would have to answer to 
the Pope in Rome, as was the case with the leaders of European nations such 
as Spain and Portugal.
 The Dutch had not brought any religious missionaries to Japan. They were 
there solely for trading relations. Holland was a protestant country, unlike the 
Catholic Spain and Portugal, so they were not really seen as a threat to power. 
In 1600, it was the Dutch ship, De Liefde, which first came to Japan for trading 
purposes. An Englishman by the name of William Adams (1564–1620), also 
known as Miura Anjin by the Japanese, was a pilot on board De Liefde, and 
because the Dutch captain of the ship, Jacob Quackernaeck happened to be 
too sick to move, the task of meeting the then Shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu, was 
given to the relatively healthy Adams. This situation was to set the course 
of Dutch-Japanese relations as well as British-Japanese relations on a very 
specific path.
 In 1609, the Dutch East India Company, or Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie (VOC), established a factory at Hirado, off the coast of Nagasaki 
thanks to the work of Adams and the crew of the ship, De Liefde. Also thanks 
to Adams, the English also established their factory at Hirado in 1613. 
However, the English business did not do well and the English left Japan 
of their own volition in 1623. The Dutch stayed and their factory was later 
moved to the island of Dejima in 1641. William Adams died in 1620 and 
Tokugawa Ieyasu died in 1616. Ieyasu had only served as Shogun from 1603 
to 1605. Ieyasu’s third son, Tokugawa Hidetada was the ruling Shogun from 
1605 to 1623, the same year the English left. Following Hidetada as Shogun 
was Tokugawa Iemitsu, Hidetada’s first son and Ieyasu’s grandson. Both 
Hidetada and Iemitsu were less enthusiastic about trade with other nations, 
and by Iemitsu’s time, the ban on Japanese leaving or returning to Japan, and 
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other nationalities (except the Dutch and the Chinese at Dejima) entering 
into Japan were thoroughly set. Japan’s foreign policy was to remain in this 
situation until the early 1850s when the American Commodore Matthew 
Calbraith Perry (1794–1858) came demanding the Japanese archipelago open 
up to foreign trade.
 During this period, Edo culture flourished, but now that Japan was united 
under one government, the Tokugawa Bakufu, there was no longer a great 
need for warriors. The samurai class remained, but their occupations became 
closer to that of administrators rather than fighting men, and they received 
stipends in the form of rice. The rice crop failures and subsequent famines 
that blighted the early 1800s, on top of the deterioration of Tokugawa 
government’s quality of leadership, were just a part of the growing problems 
that Japan was facing. The following section 2 of the paper will examine 
those internal and external elements of the Japanese nation’s troubles, as 
well as look at the philosophical ideas that developed in response to those 
troubles.
2. Internal Struggle, External Pressure  
and the Influence of Thought
 This section of the paper will examine the two key elements which the 
Tokugawa government struggled with in order to maintain its power and 
which it eventually lost its battle against. That is, firstly the section will look 
at the country’s internal struggles: the peasant uprisings and resulting internal 
political instability. Then secondly, it will consider the pressures the country 
faced from external sources; i.e. the potential threat of foreign invasion.
 Finally, this section will consider the development among the samurai of 
new ideas and thought, which came about as a response to the troubles, but 
also which led to their reactions toward the political issues and the pressure 
from foreign countries.
2.1 Peasant Uprisings and Political Instability
 Early on in Japan’s period of self-imposed, partial isolation, the country 
─  ─55
Expelling the Barbarian and the Last Stand
had flourished economically. Many castle towns had been built up, and 
relatively speaking, the country was peaceful to begin with. From the 1600s 
onwards, the samurai had no real need to fight any longer since the country 
had been unified by the three famous warlords: Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536[7?]–1598) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616) 
and now the Tokugawa clan controlled the country from Edo. The Tokugawa 
kept any rebellious daimyo lords in check with systems such as sankin 
kōtai in which in alternating years the lords were required to attend Court 
at Edo, and then leave their family members as hostages in Edo while they 
were at their own domains. Rather than fighting, the samurai turned to other 
pursuits such as studying. Many became intellects and administrators for 
the Tokugawa government and a clear hierarchy of office was established. 
Nevertheless, despite initial relative peace, there developed a gradual unrest 
among some of the people. In the 1830s, rice crop failures caused famines 
and this caused economic problems for many domains as well as the central 
Tokugawa government. In addition, many samurai became dissatisfied 
with their low wages, which were given to them in rice stipends. When rice 
crops failed, the situation became even more problematic. The Tokugawa 
government’s mismanagement of these issues resulted in a number of peasant 
and samurai rebellions. One well-known example of such rebellions occurred 
in 1837 when an insurrection came about led by the samurai and government 
administrator, Ōshio Heihachirō (1793–1837) in Osaka. Ōshio was a Neo-
Confucian scholar, and his work as a Tokugawa government administrator 
was a point which makes his leadership in the rebellion all the more poignant.
 The Tokugawa government attempted to deal with these problems of unrest 
with a set of measures called the “Tenpō Reforms” (Tenpō being the era name 
when the reforms were created, 1830–1844) in the 1840s. However, these 
reforms were wanting when it came to being effective measures to distil the 
troubles. The reforms merely demonstrated just how much the government 
had become incapable and out-of-date as an institution. The Tenpō Reforms 
were really only a revamped version of reforms that had been carried out 
in the past. In other words, there was nothing really new about them, and 
therefore, as in the case of previous attempts at reform, they were not very 
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effective in the long run.
 In Jansen’s The Emergence of Meiji Japan (1995) discussion of three 
periods of reform are raised: Tokugawa Yoshimune’s Kyōhō era (1716–36) 
reform programme, Matsudaira Sadanobu’s Kansei era (1789–1801) reforms, 
and Mizuno Tadakuni’s Tenpō era reforms. It is the Tenpō reforms that most 
closely connect with, and affect the later Meiji years. Nevertheless, the two 
former reform eras are also important as they are the foundations the Tenpō 
reforms later built upon. In basic terms, in each reform era, the Tokugawa 
government simply attempted to control the people with varying methods of 
austerity. For example, how they dressed was controlled. Lower classes of 
society such as peasants were not allowed to wear brightly coloured clothing, 
or expensive fabrics, or carry umbrellas in the rain.
 While samurai were becoming poorer due to famine and low stipends, 
merchants were becoming richer and some were able to buy samurai status. 
Corruption in government and society in general was becoming relatively 
commonplace and scholarly social critics like Rai Sanyō (1780–1832), 
who wrote Nihon Gaishi (Unofficial History of Japan) and presented it to 
Matsudaira Sadanobu in 1827, began to write about the problems within the 
Shogunate regime and society. Rai was another whose writing inspired the 
later loyalist ‘men of purpose’.
 As in Jansen’s example noted above, much has been written on the 
subject of such internal struggles and political instability within Japan 
during this period in both Japanese and English, and the scope of this paper 
unfortunately does not allow for further reiteration of what has already 
been said. Nevertheless, in order to establish clarity about the background 
of 1868, it is important to be aware of these issues. Other useful sources on 
the topic are not difficult to find in works on Japanese history. For example, 
The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 5 The Nineteenth Century7 gives 
extensive coverage on the Tenpō era and the reforms made by the Tokugawa 
leaders.
2.2 The Foreign Threat
 For Japan, aside from the internal problems it had, there was growing 
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pressure from outside for Japan to become a more open nation and 
communicate and trade with other nations. Initially, the foreign threat 
was seen as worrisome to the ruling Tokugawa government because they 
were afraid of losing their control of Japan. As has already been noted, 
the Tokugawa government feared the power of Christianity, and naturally 
as an extension of that the power of the Catholic Pope. In addition to this 
nervousness regarding religion, the Tokugawa were also wary of expanding 
Western empires, in particular, the British. From the period of the early 
1840s, Japan had received word about British activities in China regarding 
the Opium Wars, and the Japanese authorities were very concerned about 
similar attacks happening to Japan.
 In addition to Japan’s internal struggles and weakening, old government 
regime, the pressure from other nations for Japan to open its doors to foreign 
trade was becoming increasingly intense. Incidences of foreign ships entering 
into Japanese waters had been occurring ever since Japan was officially closed 
off to foreign ships. The Takarajima Incident of 1824, which will briefly be 
discussed later in section 2.3, is just one example. Dejima Island, off the coast 
of Nagasaki, was the only port where foreign vessels were allowed to dock 
and that access was limited to Chinese and Dutch ships. Despite this, foreign 
ships, whaling ships and others, often frequented the seas nearby. Finally, in 
the summer of 1853, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry arrived at Japan’s 
shores with demands for Japan to open to the Western world. The Tokugawa 
government went into panic, unable to take any decisive action. Perry 
told the Japanese that he would return the following year, 1854, expecting 
a positive response. The Tokugawa government, at a loss, proceeded to 
demonstrate just how weak an organization they had become by consulting 
all the feudal lords, or daimyō, of each domain for advice on how to deal 
with this new foreign threat. This move was unprecedented and the many 
different lords gave a relatively mixed response. However, the general mood 
was to keep the foreign barbarians out and maintain the status quo. This 
however, the Tokugawa government was gradually coming to realise, would 
be impractical.
 A number of domain lords also were very aware of the impracticality 
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of continuing to block relations with other nations. One good example of 
such a domain was Satsuma, on the southern island of Kyūshū, the castle 
town of which and seat of the domain lord and his family, Shimazu, was 
Kagoshima. Satsuma, being placed in charge of dealings with the Ryūkyū 
Islands had more opportunity to connect with other nations well before Perry 
arrived. They had had some trade, albeit surreptitiously, with China. From 
an early period they had access to information about the Opium wars and 
the activities of Britain and other nations around Asian waters. The lord of 
Satsuma, Shimazu Nariakira, who was very keen on Western learning, had 
spent a great deal of time, money and effort from the early 1850s developing 
the education of the Satsuma samurai and building up what became known as 
the Shūseikan, a Western-style industrial enterprise. This was a complex of 
buildings where Western technology such as textile-making, steel production 
and other products were recreated and several innovations were developed. 
One example was the development of the Satsuma glassware known as 
Satsuma Kiriko, the skills of which had originally been brought to Satsuma 
from craftsmen of Edo Kiriko (Edo being present-day Tokyo). Satsuma was 
later involved in the Kagoshima Bombardment of 1863, which happened as 
a result of the Namamugi Incident of 1862, and some of the guns used by 
Satsuma in their battle against the British had been made with knowledge 
developed at the Shūseikan. The complex still exists as a museum has many 
visitors today as one of Kagoshima’s popular tourist spots.
 Despite the preparations of some domains, however, for the most part, 
Japan was not well-prepared to protect itself against foreign invasion. The 
internal struggle within Japan and the foreign threat from nations outside 
Japan, in the words of Harold Bolitho (1995), “… brought on a crisis without 
parallel in Tokugawa history, shaking society to its very foundations.”8 The 
end was nigh for the Tokugawa government who were no longer adequately 
equipped to deal with the amount of difficulties it was faced with. The 
perceived foreign threat to her shores was one that, despite the warnings from 
various scholars and other social commentators, Japan and the Japanese were 
simply not ready for. The following section of the paper will consider some 
of these warnings and the men who propagated them.
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2.3  Nineteenth Century Japanese Thought and the Prevalence of Mito 
School Ideals
 The theory of Jōi, or “Expelling the Barbarian” can be traced to the Mito 
School of ideas. J. Victor Koschmann’s The Mito Ideology (1987) may be 
called one of the seminal works on the subject available in English. Another 
writer, Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi has also written an extensive work on 
the subject of Mito scholar, Aizawa Seishisai, which includes an English 
translation of Aizawa’s New Theses in which the ideas for Jōi are clearly 
visible9. Wakabayashi stresses the importance of his English translation of 
the work,
 New Theses has immense significance as a historical document 
because it roused late Tokugawa shishi to violent action; they did not 
hurl it aside in disgust because it was boring. The historical significance 
of the work warrants making it accessible to Western readers10.
 However, Koschmann suggests that the Mito theorists did not necessarily 
bring about the turmoil of the Restoration years but that their texts were given 
new meaning. He says,
… rather than “causing” the Meiji Restoration, or “influencing” those 
who did, Mito simply offered its texts to be read and its meaningful 
actions to be reenacted (sic) by others, thereby giving them new 
importance beyond their original contextual relevance.11
 Certainly Aizawa never intended for a Restoration or abandoning the 
Shogunate; he merely wanted an improvement of the Tokugawa system. 
Nevertheless, his written works were key in the development of ideas among 
those ‘men of purpose’. Therefore, knowledge of Aizawa’s work is vital in 
order to grasp an understanding of the Mito Ideology and this section will 
explain some details about that publication. First, however, a brief look at 
who Aizawa and the then Lord of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki were will be 
given, in order to grasp an understanding of how the Aizawa text became 
prevalent.
 Aizawa Seishisai, also known as Aizawa Yasushi, was born in the domain 
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of Mito in 1781, now part of Ibaraki Prefecture. Aizawa studied under 
the noted Mito scholar Fujita Yūkoku (1774–1826), originally the son of 
a second-hand clothing merchant12. In the foreword to his translation of 
Shinron, Wakabayashi explains that due to both men coming from a low 
ranking social status, in theory, neither of them were allowed to participate 
in domain government policy-making.13 However, Aizawa managed to gain a 
close connection to the Lord of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, and it was Nariaki 
that allowed Aizawa’s Shinron to spread to a wider audience. Wakabayashi 
notes that it became “a virtual bible to activists in the ‘revere the Emperor, 
expel the barbarian’ movement”.14 Originally, Shinron had been written in 
Classical Chinese but it was rendered into the Japanese language later on in 
the 1850s thus allowing a much broader readership.15
 Tokugawa Nariaki, unlike his predecessor, was more sympathetic to the 
Mito Ideology cause. Nariaki was born in 1800. He became the ninth lord 
of the Mito domain in 1829. He advised the Tokugawa Bakufu on issues 
of national defence and strongly urged the expansion of Japan’s military 
defences. Nariaki also expanded the Mito education system, which had 
originally been established by Tokugawa Mitsukuni, or as he is otherwise 
known, Mitō Kōmon (1628–1701). Mitsukuni has also been in charge of 
organising scholars of Mito to compile Dai Nihon-shi, or the Great History 
of Japan, which many samurai later went on to study, including Nariaki 
himself. Heavily influenced by Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, that 
publication established the roots of kokugaku, or what may be termed “Native 
Studies”; in other words, “Japanese Studies” as opposed to Kangaku, or 
“Chinese Studies”. Thus, the beginnings of Mito Ideology were becoming 
established. This paper places focus on Aizawa’s Shinron, but there are 
numerous other scholars who were involved in the spread of these ideas. 
Fujita Tōkō (1806–1855) and Toyoda Tenkō (1805–1864) are examples of 
just two other famous names.
 New Theses, or Shinron (新論), was published in 1825, the same year 
the Tokugawa government had issued its Expulsion Edict to repel foreign 
vessels from Japan’s shores (異国船打払令, Ikokusen Uchiharai-rei). In the 
previous year, 1824, there had been an incident at the island of Takarajima, 
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off the coast of Kagoshima, in which a British ship appeared, the crew of 
which landed on the island demanding supplies. The exchange began as a 
friendly one; island officials allowed a number of men to land and goods 
were exchanged. However, difficulties began when the English sailors began 
making demands for some black bulls they had spotted because they wanted 
the meat. The Japanese islanders refused and the Englishmen returned to their 
ship, but instead of sailing off, they lingered in the port, and that evening 
some Englishmen returned to the island to try and take some of the bulls. 
They were caught out and a skirmish with the island officials ensued, but in 
the chaos one of the Englishmen was shot dead. The Takarajima incident was 
just one of several incidents which encouraged the Tokugawa government 
to strengthen their laws on not allowing foreign influx to Japan. For Aizawa 
Seishisai and many other Japanese of the time, the increasing number of 
foreign ships appearing in Japanese waters was extremely alarming. The 
British, in particular, were seen as pirates, and even in the present day, on 
Takarajima Island, there is a hill slope called Igirisu-zaka, or, the English 
Hill, to remind the locals of the terror of the Takarajima Incident.
 To get some idea of the kind of language Aizawa used, the following are 
a selection of quotes from the text as translated by Wakabayashi. Aizawa 
starts his Shinron text with strong, bold words that set the tone to make it 
immediately clear to his readers that Japan and the Japanese people are a 
superior set of beings above the rest of the world,
Our Divine Realm is where the sun emerges. It is the source of the 
primordial vital force (yuan ch’i) sustaining all life and order. Our 
Emperors, descendants of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, have acceded 
to the Imperial Throne in each and every generation, a unique fact that 
will never change. Our Divine Realm rightly constitutes the head and 
shoulders of the world and controls all nations.16
 Regarding Western invasion, and making his stance on Western peoples 
in general, Aizawa warns the Japanese people of the situation as he sees it 
especially those who live in coastal areas,
[Unless appropriate steps are taken] all people in coastal regions will 
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flee for the hills under enemy assaults. The barbarian dogs and goats 
would trample us underfoot, and nothing could save us.17
 The Westerners are clearly not even deemed human by Aizawa. His disdain 
for Western peoples goes to the level of name calling and abusive terms in 
describing them. Wakabayashi, in his explanation of the Aizawa text also 
makes note of this point,
Aizawa, too, denigrated Westerners, calling them “stupid barbarians,” 
“dogs and goats,” and other like names. But such blustering and 
vilification should not obscure the fact that he took their threat in dead 
earnest.18
 Certainly, for Aizawa and many other Japanese, the threat was indeed very 
real. For several hundred years the Japanese had been very cautious about 
allowing Christianity to spread in Japan and here also Wakabayashi goes on 
to explain,
Aizawa asserted the need for a consistent, sustained program of religious 
and cultural “counter-transformation” supplemented by armed might.19
 Indeed, even when the Satsuma samurai Nakai Hiromu later travelled 
to Britain in 1866, he wrote in his journal about the need for the Japanese 
people to be clear about their own religion, and he raises Shinto as the rightful 
religion for the Japanese people.20 It is not absolutely clear whether Nakai 
read Aizawa’s text, but the influence of Shinron was already widely spread 
by 1866. Koschmann explains that,
 It is indisputable that many of the individuals who led the anti-
bakufu movement had gone through some sort of “Mito experience”. 
Maki Izumi (1813–1864), Yoshida Shōin (1830–1859), Kusaka Gensui 
(1840–1864), and Umeda Unpin (1815–1859) all went to Mito at least 
once between the mid-1840s and early 1860s and left evidence of 
having read and pondered major works by Mito ideologues. Yoshida, 
particularly stayed in Mito for a full month late in 1851 and early 1852, 
and spent time with Aizawa, Toyota (sic) Tenkō (1805–1864), and other 
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Mito personalities.21
 Certainly, it is indisputable that many read the Aizawa text among others 
from the Mito ideology ilk, and even where some samurai and others 
who were involved in the Meiji restoration did not actually read the texts 
themselves, the influence of those who had, spread across all levels of 
society. Then, when the Westerners began to come into Japan after the 
signing of the Ansei Treaties (1854–58), the amount of fear toward them can 
be seen in the growing number of attacks made on them in those early years. 
The same is true of attacks made on Japanese who were in favour of opening 
Japan to the West; the murder of Ii Naosuke, who made the decision to sign 
the Ansei Treaties, being one example.
 In November 1864, two British officers, Major George Walter Baldwin 
and Lieutenant Robert Nichols Bird of the 20th regiment, were murdered in 
Wakamiya Oji in Kamakura in what is now Kanagawa Prefecture by samurai 
“men of purpose” who wanted to see the foreigners out of Japan. Shimizu 
Seiji, the key perpetrator in the incident, was beheaded and his head was then 
publicly displayed for three days. Despite his treatment as a criminal, to many 
Japanese he was seen as a hero doing his duty to his country.
 Yamada Masaru argues, however, that in some cases, the men who carried 
out these attacks were not necessarily doing it because of their beliefs but 
because they wanted the prestige and hoped for the opportunity to find 
work.22 This may be true in some cases, but to many Japanese at the time, 
the more dead foreigners, the better. Many attacks were made on foreign 
nationals: Henry Heusken, the Dutch-American interpreter for the American 
Consulate was murdered in 1861. Charles Lennox Richardson was murdered 
in the Namamugi Incident in 1862.  Other unsuccessful attempts to kill a 
member of the foreign community also occurred; the arson attack on the 
British Legation at Tōzenji being one example in which British legation 
secretary Laurence Oliphant (1829–1888) was badly injured. Whatever the 
reasons behind the attacks, however, the foreign community members were 
obviously not content with the constant possibility of being murdered.
 The following section 3 of the paper will examine three key incidences 
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that occurred in 1868 that affected the Meiji government’s decision-making 
policies in dealing with issues regarding foreign diplomacy. The foreign 
community had had enough and by 1868 they began to put pressure on the 
Japanese government to curb these incidences of terrorism.
3. The Last Stand: Three Key Incidences of Jōi  
in 1868 and the Significance of Nawate
 At the beginning of 1868, three important incidences occurred. These 
three incidences can be considered incidences of Jōi which heavily affected 
the decision-making among members of the new Meiji government toward 
Japan’s foreign policy.
 Each of these three incidences play an important part in policy decision 
making, but it is the last incident, the Nawate Incident, and the resulting 
responses from the British side, which firmly set the tone for future 
diplomatic relations and seemingly placed an official stop on further attempts 
to ‘expel the barbarians’.
3.1 The Kobe Incident
 The first of these three incidences was the Kobe Incident, also known as 
the Bizen Affair, which occurred on the eleventh day of the first month of 
the fourth year of Keio23. In Western calendar dating that was February 4th, 
1868. To this day, the site of the incident is indicated by a commemorative 
stone marker, which can be seen in Kobe city outside Sannomiya Shrine. 
Soldiers from the domain of Bizen (present-day Okayama) fired upon the 
crew members of foreign ships that were docked in the port, which had only 
recently been opened to trade with the West. Apparently unaware that it was 
a criminal offence to cut across the path of a domain lord’s guard procession; 
the foreign sailors were duly attacked by the Bizen guards. Ernest Satow 
explains that it was an American soldier24 who had initially crossed the path 
of the procession, but in fact it is understood to have been a French sailor. 
Nevertheless, what then proceeded was according to Satow, an attempt on “the 
life of every foreigner who they met, but without serious consequences”25. 
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Afterwards, the Governor General of the new Meiji government’s Foreign 
Department, Higashikuze Michitomi (1834–1912) went to make negotiations 
on how to deal with the attack. It was decided that Taki Zenzaburō, who had 
given orders to fire on the foreign sailors should take responsibility and he 
was do this by taking his own life.
 The resulting seppuku of Taki Zenzaburō was the first to be witnessed by 
foreign representatives. An account of Taki’s seppuku was made by Algernon 
Bertram Mitford (1837–1916), one of the secretaries to the British minister, 
Harry Parkes. Mitford wrote an article about the seppuku ceremony, which 
was published in the British press and later formed part of Mitford’s 1871 
publication, Tales of Old Japan. Of the incident and Taki’s subsequent death, 
Mitford says,
 The offence—an attack upon the flags and subjects of all the Treaty 
Powers, which lack of skill, not of will, alone prevented from ending 
in a universal massacre—was the gravest that has been committed 
upon foreigners since their residence in Japan. Death was undoubtedly 
deserved, and the form chosen was in Japanese eyes merciful and yet 
judicial. The crime might have involved war and cost hundreds of lives; 
it was wiped out by one death.26
 Ernest Satow (1843–1929), a British Legation secretary at the time, also 
wrote of his ideas on how he thought the outcome of the Kobe Incident 
should play out in his A Diplomat in Japan,
 I proposed to Sir Harry that we should issue a manifesto declaring 
that if Bizen’s people did not satisfactorily explain their behaviour, the 
foreign powers would make it a quarrel with Japan as a whole.27
 From Satow’s quote, it is clear that tensions between the foreign 
community and the Japanese were rising. Mitford also notes in the preceding 
quote that there might have been the possibility for all-out war. Indeed, 
representatives of the foreign community even went as far as posting public 
notices in Japanese throughout the areas of Hyōgo, Osaka and other parts of 
the country. The first point on these notices read:
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 To-day, as Ikida (sic) Isé and Hikei Tade Ware, retainers of Matsdaira 
Bezen No Kami, were passing through the town of Kobé, their followers, 
without provocation, attacked and wounded foreigners with spears and 
fire-arms. You must immediately come forward and explain this matter. 
If full reparation be not given, it will be assumed that you are the enemy 
of foreign nations, who will take measures to punish this outrage. It must 
be borne in mind that this matter will then concern not only the Bizen 
clan, but may also cause grave trouble to the whole of Japan.
 This declaration is made by all the foreign representatives.
 Hiogo, February 4, 1868.28
 Fortunately however, Parkes and other leading representatives eventually 
became more thoughtful about how they should respond. The death of Taki 
was what both the Japanese and foreign representatives believed would be 
enough to allow the high tensions to subside.
 In its origins, the Kobe Incident is not unlike the Namamugi Incident, or 
Richardson Affair, that occurred on September 14th, 1862. In that incident, a 
small group of four British merchants who were travelling along the Tokaido 
route on a day trip came across the retinue of the Satsuma lord, Shimazu 
Hisamitsu, and because they did not get down from their horses as they were 
told, one of them, Richardson was killed.
 The difference, however, between the Kobe Incident and the Namamugi 
Incident is the manner in which the incidents were dealt with by the 
authorities. Nobody in the Namamugi Incident was brought forward to take 
responsibility for Richardson’s death. Yano Tsuneo also points out29 that the 
Japanese authorities did not want a repeat of the Kagoshima Bombardment 
(Anglo-Satsuma War), which had come about as a result of the Namamugi 
Incident. The fear of the possibility of war caused the newly established 
Meiji government to act in a more decisive manner. They would placate the 
foreign representatives with Taki’s self-disembowelment. However, such a 
ceremonial death was still considered honourable, the death of a samurai. 
Mitford’s now famous piece about the honourable suicide was a grotesquely 
romantic depiction, which left a great impression on Westerners who came 
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to Japan later on. They saw the legendary samurai as heroic protectors of 
their homeland. The reality for those who experienced the actual threat of 
attack was perhaps somewhat of a less romantic and more terror-inciting 
experience, however. On the Japanese side too, Taki became a hero, a martyr, 
dying for his country by taking responsibility for the incident. His ceremonial 
death was one of great honour, and he was not, in Japanese eyes, seen as a 
criminal but a martyr for the cause. This reality did not dawn on the foreign 
representatives until later on as this paper will show.
3.2 The Sakai Incident
 The second incident is known as the Sakai Incident, and this occurred just 
over a month later on March 8th in the Western calendar. In the Japanese 
calendar, that was the 15th day of the second month in the fourth year of 
Keio (or the first year of Meiji). In this incident, samurai from the domain 
of Tosa who were patrolling the port of Sakai in Osaka attacked and killed 
eleven French sailors from the ship, Dupliex. Japanese Foreign Department 
officials, Nakai Hiromu, Godai Tomoatsu (1836–1885, Godai later became a 
leading businessman and established the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and 
the Osaka Stock Exchange) and another colleague, had the gruesome task 
of retrieving the bodies from the sea and making a record for the Japanese 
government’s official reports regarding the type of wounds each sailor had.30
 Harry Parkes, the British minister made his thoughts known to the Japanese 
Foreign Department officials, Higashikuze Michitomi and Date Munenari 
(1818–1892, originally the Lord of the Uwajima domain; in present-day 
Ehime prefecture) by writing to them on March 12th, just four days after the 
incident. In his letter he expresses his indignation,
 Their Excellencies are aware of the indignation felt by the 
Undersigned in common with his colleagues the Representatives of the 
Foreign Powers then in Osaka, when they heard, at one o’clock, on the 
morning of the 9th instant, that the crew of a steam launch belonging 
to a French Ship of War had been barbarously murdered at Sakai the 
previous afternoon. That feeling unfortunately was not lessened when, 
after a delay of ten hours, and eighteen from the time of the murder, 
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the account given by Their Excellencies to the Foreign Representatives 
proved utterly untrue, and no information was furnished respecting the 
missing men.
 Under such circumstances, the Undersigned felt bound to withdraw 
together with the other Representatives from Osaka, to mark his 
abhorrence of the horrible crime, and his disapproval of the way in 
which it had till then been dealt with by the Mikado’s Government.31
 Harry Parkes’ letter is very strongly worded and no doubt came across to 
the Japanese as very threatening. He continues his threats in his angry tones,
 The Undersigned … hastens to urge the Mikado’s Government to 
comply with … as little delay as possible. It is of the highest importance 
that the Mikado’s Government should prove by the promptness with 
which complete redress is rendered in this case that they will not suffer 
the name of the Mikado to be disgraced by such abominable acts, and 
that his Majesty has power to suppress them. It is only by such a course 
that the Government of the Mikado can expect to receive the respect of 
foreign nations.32
 Clearly, Parkes is developing a clever way of coercing the Japanese 
government to respond in the manner he deems suitable by using the name of 
the Japanese Emperor and suggesting that these incidents are shedding a poor 
light on both the Emperor and his government. If Japan wants respect on the 
world stage he suggests that they “comply” with the British representatives 
demands.
 Regarding the Sakai Incident, the British Legation secretary Ernest Satow 
explains the confusion over the bodies of the missing men,
 The dead bodies of the seven missing French sailors having been 
found, Daté and Higashi-Kuzé went on board the French flagship 
“Vénus” to inform M. Roches. But by some curious blunder the 
boxes containing the corpses were first sent to the British transport 
“Adventure,” where they were mistaken for cases of “curios” belonging 
to our Legation, and how the discovery was made of the real nature of 
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the contents I never heard, but they did not arrive at the French flagship 
till late in the afternoon.33
 Satow also notes, “It was evident to everybody that the execution of the 
Bizen officer [Taki Zenzaburō] had not had the effect of a warning.”34 It is 
clear from this quote that some members of the foreign community were 
not happy with the method the Kobe Incident had been dealt with. The 
organisation of the Meiji government was bad enough, but Taki’s death had 
clearly not been a strong enough deterrent to prevent further attacks. Taki had 
been given an honourable death by being allowed to commit seppuku like a 
true samurai. His was not the death of a criminal. However, Satow also gives 
an indication of the British Minister, Harry Parkes’ thoughts on the Sakai 
incident, “In Sir Harry’s own opinion a large number of the Tosa men ought 
to suffer death, but he did not approve of pecuniary indemnities.”35 Although 
Satow does not tell his readers why Parkes does not see a necessity for 
monetary compensation, this comment may provide a clue to the ideas that 
appears to be forming in Parkes’ mind regarding how to deal with attacks on 
foreign community members in future to absolutely ensure that they would 
not occur again. In examining the next incident, the Nawate Incident, Parkes’ 
reactions and the Japanese responses to him seem to change the way the 
foreign community and the Japanese policymakers interact on a greater scale.
3.3 The Nawate Incident and the End of the Jōi Movement?
 The Nawate Incident occurred on March 23rd, 1868. In the Japanese 
calendar, that was the 30th day of the second month in the fourth year of 
Keio (or the first year of Meiji). The then British Minister representing her 
Majesty Queen Victoria’s government, Harry Smith Parkes and his entourage 
were on their way to conduct an official visit to his Imperial Majesty the 
Emperor Meiji for the first time. The meeting had been arranged earlier and 
it included the Emperor’s first meeting with the Dutch and French Ministers 
also. Governors on the Japanese side had spent many weeks preparing for the 
meeting.
 Ernest Mason Satow, who was accompanying the British minister, 
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recorded his recollections of the incident in his 1921 publication, A Diplomat 
in Japan,
“It was arranged that we should start from Chi-on-in for the palace 
at one o’ clock on March 23. The procession was to be headed by the 
mounted escort, led by Inspector Peacock and Nakai, then Sir Harry 
and Goto, myself and Lieutenant Bradshaw, the detachment of the 2/ix, 
followed by Willis, J. J. Enslie, Mitford in a palanquin (being unable to 
ride) and five naval officers who had come up with us. We descended 
the whole length of the street called Nawate opposite to the main gate of 
Chi-on-in, but just as the last file of the mounted escort turned the corner 
to the right, a couple of men sprang out from opposite sides of the street, 
drew their swords, and attacked the men and horses, running down the 
line and hacking wildly. Nakai observing what was passing jumped 
down from his pony and engaged the fellow on the right, with whom 
he had a pretty tough fight. In the struggle his feet got entangled in his 
long loose trousers, and he fell on his back. His enemy tried to cut off 
his head, but Nakai parried the blow, receiving only a scalp wound, and 
pierced the man’s breast with the point of his sword at the same time. 
This sickened him, and as he was turning his back on Nakai he received 
a blow on the shoulder from Goto’s sword, which prostrated him on the 
ground, and Nakai jumping up hacked off his head”.36
 In the aftermath of this incident, the British Minister, Harry Parkes, made 
four demands on the Meiji government. First, he demanded that the Japanese 
government present a formal letter apologising for the incident. Secondly, 
he demanded that the men who made the attack should not be allowed to die 
by their own hand and commit seppuku, or self-disembowelment. He now 
understood that such an honourable suicide would turn the criminals into 
heroic martyrs. Parkes knew that by making this demand he was setting the 
Nawate Incident apart from the Kobe and Sakai incidents in which the men 
who took responsibility would be seen as having maintained their honour. 
By taking away the privilege of committing suicide, the men responsible 
for the Nawate Incident simply became common criminals and would be 
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remembered as such by the public.
 Parkes wanted to make sure that such attacks on foreigners would 
absolutely never be repeated ever again. He believed that the best way to 
prevent more attacks would be to make such actions a criminal offence with 
the worst kind of shame37 attached to it. In his letter to Lord Stanley of March 
25th, 1868, Parkes explains,
… I recurred to arguments which I had previously held with some 
members of the Government as to the necessity of an enactment being 
speedily issued which should attach the penalty of an ignominious 
death to all Samurai who committed murderous attacks upon foreigners, 
instead of allowing them to die with credit by their own hand.38
 Parkes was thoroughly insistent on the topic and further on in the same 
letter he explains further to Lord Stanley that,
… the general measure I had advocated will be adopted in this case: 
the man will first be deprived of his rank, and he will then die by 
the common executioner instead of by his own hand. The Ministers 
proceeded to assure me that this would become the law of such cases in 
future, and that a proclamation of the character I had advocated should 
speedily be issued, and a draft furnished to me before I left Kioto. 
They willingly agreed that this proclamation should be promulgated in 
the formal and permanent manner adopted by themselves in regard to 
standing enactments, namely, by inscription on boards which are affixed 
upon a sort of monumental arch constructed at conspicuous places in 
their towns and villages.39
 In his third demand, Parkes insisted that the Emperor must announce to 
the Japanese people the intentions of his government for promoting good 
relations with foreign nations. Finally, in his fourth demand Parkes called for 
the Meiji government’s compulsory duty to thoroughly eradicate any notion 
among the Japanese people of becoming involved in attacks on, or becoming 
hostile to, foreign representatives and residents in Japan.
 Whilst making such strong demands on the Japanese government, Parkes 
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was also very careful to mention the positive actions on the Japanese 
government’s side in relation to their actions at the time of the incident. 
He commends the two Japanese government representatives especially for 
saving his life. In a letter from Kyoto on March 25th, just two days after 
the incident, sent to the Japanese government heads including Prince Sanjō 
Sanetomi (1837–1891) and Iwakura Tomomi (1825–1883), Parkes says,
The undersigned cannot close this despatch without bearing testimony to 
the noble behaviour of Goto Shojiro and Nakai Kozô, the two Japanese 
officers who were conducting him to the palace when he was attacked.
Regardless of their own safety, and thinking only of the duty with which 
they were charged, they threw themselves upon the assassins, and killed 
one of them upon the spot. The undersigned deeply regrets that Nakai 
Kozô should have received a severe wound in the struggle.40
 As Satow hasd noted, Nakai had received a scalp wound. He took time after 
the Nawate Incident for convalescence during which he managed to work on 
the publication of his travel diary of his recent journey to Britain. Nakai had 
started out with the same ideas of jōi like Sakamoto Ryōma and like the two 
perpetrators of the Nawate attack, Saegusa Shigeru and Hayashida Sadakata, 
and now here he was preventing these men from carrying out their purpose 
in order to save the barbarian he had also once so vehemently hated. His 
situation was the same for many other Meiji leaders who had started out with 
ideas of jōi. The difference between the Nawate Incident and the Kobe and 
Sakai incidents is of course clear in a practical sense: nobody on the foreign 
community side was actually killed or severely wounded at Nawate. This 
may be one key reason why the incident has not been as well remembered 
by the history books, unlike the Kobe and Sakai incidents. However, in a 
conceptual sense, despite the fact that nobody was killed among the foreign 
residents, this incident at Nawate is perhaps the most important of all the 
three cases.
 It was the Nawate Incident that caused the members of the foreign 
community, in particular the British, to make such strong demands on the 
Meiji government to put a stop to attacks on foreigners once and for all. 
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Harry Parkes’ adamant demands on the government forced them to take 
action. Just as he demanded, on April 7th, 1868, the Meiji government 
posted official proclamations on notice boards around Japan upon which the 
stance of the Meiji government was made clear41. All together there were 
five proclamations made to the Japanese public by the new government. 
They were: 1) adherence to the five relationship bonds of Confucianism, 
2) prohibition of making direct petitions, conspiracy and abandoning one’s 
land for tax evasion purposes, 3) prohibition of Christianity, 4) prohibition 
on attacking foreigners, and 5) prohibition on travelling outside of one’s 
domain or out of the country. Most of these proclamations were not terribly 
different from previous government announcements, but for the first time, 
the fourth proclamation made it very clear to the Japanese people what the 
consequences would be if anybody attempted to attack a member of the 
foreign community.
 By 1868, Japan was changing. It was becoming a new ‘Westernised’ nation. 
With the Meiji era, and an Emperor who was more favourable to connecting 
with the West than his predecessor, Emperor Komei had been, Japan was 
gradually opening up to the West. Many of those who had previously had 
ideas of jōi, like Nakai,’s example, recognised the need for Western learning. 
Some of them even travelled abroad to study. The notion of maintaining the 
old status quo in Japan and remaining secluded was gradually realised as 
unfeasible. Instead, Japan went ‘full steam ahead’ into industrialisation and 
modernisation.
4. Conclusion
 This paper has attempted to examine the reasons for, development, and 
eventual waning of, the theory of Jōi, or “Expelling the Barbarian”, by 
bringing to attention the activities of a number of key actors and events in 
Japanese history. Attention has been placed on three key events in early 1868 
that, at least officially, brought an end to the concept of jōi, in particular the 
final event known as the Nawate Incident of March 23rd, 1868. The paper 
has suggested that it was this key event that turned things around for the 
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relationship between the foreign nations involved in Japan, and the change 
in Japan’s policy towards other nations. That is not to say that all incidences 
of foreign representatives in Japan being attacked ended completely with 
the Nawate Incident. Unfortunately, somewhat later on, there was one very 
famous incident, the Ōtsu Incident, of May 11th 1891, for example. That 
was a failed attempt made on the life of the Russian Crown Prince, Nicholas, 
who later became the Russian Emperor Nicholas II. The incident occurred 
in Ōtsu, Shiga Prefecture when he was visiting on a day trip to Lake Biwa 
from Kyoto. The attacker was Tsuda Sanzō (1855–1891) who was one of the 
prince’s escorting police officers who believed Nicholas was in Japan as a 
spy in order to plan for a Russian invasion of Japan. Tsuda struck Nicholas 
in the face with a sabre, but the blow was parried by Nicholas’ cousin, Prince 
George of Greece, who was accompanying Nicholas on his trip. Tsuda was 
sent to prison for his actions, and later that year, died in prison of illness.
 There were also incidences of attacks being made on Japanese Meiji 
government leaders for their policies and decision-making. One good 
example of that is the attack made on Ōkubo Toshimichi in 1878, the Satsuma 
samurai who had been a key leader in the Meiji government; he was a 
member of the Iwakura Mission that had travelled around the world learning 
from the West, and he helped Japan to modernise. There were then, still some 
attacks that occurred, but they were no longer based strictly on the concept of 
jōi per se. Japan was modernising and becoming a member state on the world 
stage.
 Japan went on to fight the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) as well as the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and won both wars. The other Great Powers, 
including Britain, gradually came to see Japan as a force to be reckoned with. 
Indeed, Britain formed an alliance with Japan in 1902, which continued for 
some twenty years. As Japan modernised and entered the world stage, the 
Jōi Movement gradually became a thing of the past. Instead, Japan was able 
to gain the respect of the international community and there was less fear of 
Japan being invaded. Rather, Japan began to build up its own empire and, 
as later history demonstrates, became the invader. Some might argue that 
jōi actually did not disappear, but instead came closer to its real meaning. 
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Michael Gardiner, in his work on the life of Thomas Glover explains,
Joi is often transliterated as ‘Expel the foreigner!’, complete with 
exclamation mark, but jo derives from cleaning or wiping, and i is 
difference, suggesting ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a translation. Nevertheless 
joi had a double aim of maintaining ethnic purity and aspiring to foreign 
logistics, meaning that the joi rebels were more willing to be ‘open’ than 
the recognised government.42
 In actuality, many of those who had been influenced by the texts of 
the Mito school, such as Aizawa Seishisai’s Shinron, whether they had 
directly read them or not, had later gone on to become leaders of the Meiji 
government. Two famous Chōshū men of the Meiji period, Itō Hirobumi 
(1841–1909) who went on to become Japan’s first Prime Minister, and Inoue 
Kaoru (1836–1915) who was the Meiji government’s Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and attempted to right the wrongs of the Unequal Treaties signed by Ii 
Naosuke’s government; Inoue also had the Rokumeikan built for the purpose 
of entertaining foreign guests, were both involved in an arson attack on the 
British Legation when it was stationed at Tōzenji in Edo, in 1861. Just four 
years after they attacked the Legation, both men travelled secretly to Britain 
in 1865. They had both, by that point, come to realise the futility of trying to 
keep the foreigners out of Japan. Japan needed to study the technology and 
sciences, among other subjects, that were advancing in the West.
 These ‘men of purpose’ now held the weighty reins of responsibility and 
power with the Emperor as their Divine leader. They now understood that if 
they could not beat the great foreign powers they would have to join them, 
and make Japan a great power, too. The three key incidents at Kobe, Sakai 
and Nawate gave these new leaders the experience they needed for successful 
diplomatic relations with other nations. They managed to earn the respect of 
Western powers. Indeed, Western powers were even surprised at how quickly 
and skilfully the Japanese were able to develop into a modern nation. Many 
visitors to Japan even found themselves lamenting Japan’s modernisation and 
wishing Japan had remained the exotic, romantic place they had read about. 
At least now they were able to move about freely without the fear of attack 
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and death looming over them. As for the Japanese people, modernisation 
brought with it new challenges; connection with the world brought new 
dilemmas, particularly in the form of identity and nationalism.
 The subject of jōi is a key element of Japan’s modern history. Although 
the terminology may be Japanese and its usage is only usually seen in a 
Japanese historical context, the concept of “expelling barbarians” is one that 
has appeared time and time again in various countries across the globe. The 
human-constructed concept of national borders, and who belongs within 
them, or outside them, is one that has plagued the minds of humans since 
the early days of their development. It is a concept that humanity is perhaps 
unlikely to abandon in any near future, and therefore, it is one that needs a 
more concrete understanding in order to deal with it in the best way possible, 
preferably without humans inflicting pain or damage on each other. From 
this perspective, an historical study, such as this paper has attempted to 
introduce, of the thought processes that go into, and the actions that come out 
of, the idea of “expelling barbarians”, or “expelling the foreign”, is vital to 
developing better human relationships.
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36 Ibid, p. 356.
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Relations, unpublished doctoral thesis, Kyoto University 2012.
38 British Documents on Foreign Affairs—Reports and Papers from the Foreign 
Office Confidential Print, Ian Nish (ed.), (University Publications of America, 1989). 
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